Explaining Essendon’s Finals Wins Drought: 25 Years of Decisions, Bad Luck, and Lessons
- Ian Hume
- Mar 10
- 5 min read
Summary
There isn’t one grand theory that explains Essendon’s lack of finals wins since 2004. It’s a compound story: justified-at-the-time decisions that didn’t age well, missed opportunities, structural underinvestment, external shocks, and a recurring impatience that sought shortcuts over sustained build. This article traces the eras, identifies the choices, and distinguishes bad luck from poor process. And then looks forward to what’s different now.
Ground Rules
Before we start: everyone discussed here wanted Essendon to succeed. No one arrived to sabotage the club. But over more than two decades, inconsistency in decision‑making, misalignment at key moments, and divergent views of “the path back” created a stop‑start cycle. Some calls were reasonable in context; hindsight shows where they fell short.
The Lucky 1990s and the Lesson We Missed
Essendon’s 1990s success wasn’t purely design; luck played a role:
Zones wind‑down delivered value (e.g., Mercuri, Misiti, Alessio) right before abolition.
Expansion concessions (Fremantle’s entry) helped land Lloyd and Lucas. Cornerstones of the 2000 flag side.
Those breaks don’t diminish the 2000 premiership; they do caution against assuming the same pipeline would keep delivering without change. The club too often credited “what we were doing” rather than the unique tailwinds—and stagnation followed.
Takeaway: When conditions change, systems must evolve with them.
Stagnation → Decline (2001–2007)
From 1980–2001 Essendon missed finals just five times, with seven Grand Finals and three additional prelims. Success bred an assumption that the model would keep working.
Warning signs:
Underinvestment in high performance and facilities (Windy Hill lagged). That hurt both development and recruitment (top targets looked elsewhere).
Salary cap upheaval and AFL rule changes triggered a fire sale: Hardwick, Blumfield, Heffernan, Moorcroft, Caracella. That stripped the “bridge” cohort between club legends and the next wave (Stanton, Watson, Monfries, Ryder).
Bad fortune with Adam Ramanauskas’ illness deprived the side of a potential top‑tier player.
Draft returns were middling. Some misfortune (e.g., Gumbleton’s injuries) and timing (priority pick rules shifted) compounded it.
Counterpoint on Sheedy: The departure timing (after three straight non‑finals years to 2007) was reasonable. Longevity wasn’t the core cause of the long‑term decline.
The Matthew Knights Era: A Hospital Pass (2008–2010)
Following Sheedy was always going to be brutal.
Decision points:
Coach search process: Not waiting to interview Bomber Thompson was poor process (even if Geelong’s 2007 flag made a move unlikely). Hardwick might have earned longer rope as a favourite son but Richmond’s timeline suggests patience would still have been tested.
Structural hangovers: Football spend still lagged; the cap‑forced exodus still hurt list balance.
Drafting improved at the top end: Hooker, Hurley, Zaharakis, Melksham, Carlisle, Heppell across 3 years. An above‑average haul even with misses (EG. Steinberg over Parker).
Lesson: Good picks can’t fully offset structural and process gaps.
The Evans/Hird Shift—and the Catastrophic Miss (2010–2013)
This was the first wholesale pivot since 2000:
Leadership & resourcing: Hird head coach; Thompson, McCartney, Goodwin assistants; Robson CEO. Investment rose. The Hangar replaced Windy Hill in October 2013. Football Analysts moved to full‑time roles in this period.
Impatience reappears: The rush to regain status contributed to a catastrophic error. IE - not waiting to pursue Darren Burgess (world‑class HPM) and instead hiring Robinson/Dank.
The SAGA: Regardless of views on substances administered, the club’s greatest failing was inadequate governance and record‑keeping. When accused, Essendon couldn’t prove it hadn’t administered banned substances. The punishments and reputational damage followed.
Flow‑ons: Coaching disruption, financial strain, and key departures (Carlisle, Hibberd, Melksham, Ryder). Draft sanctions hurt but value still found (Merrett, Fantasia, Langford, Laverde).
Lesson: Process and documentation are non‑negotiable. Impatience kills rigor.
Post‑SAGA: Stability vs. Ambition (2016–2019)
Priorities were credibility, solvency, and reconnection.
Financial rebuild under Xavier Campbell stabilised the club but likely delayed maximum football spend.
Worsfold provided steady hands and a finals return (helped by Joe Daniher’s 2017 AA season).
Aggressive trading in 2017 (Saad, Smith, Stringer) had merit in isolation but Daniher’s injuries blew up the plan. The 2018 Shiel trade compounded risk (three years without a first‑round pick) for a side still mid‑pack.
Player‑led latitude post‑SAGA rebuilt trust but diluted standards; a group raised in a non‑elite program struggled to define an elite one.
Lesson: Rebuild trust, yes, but standards and list strategy must align to reality, not hope.
COVID Disruption and the Reset That Wasn’t (2020–2022)
Environment stress test: Hub living magnified friction; good people rarely leave good environments. Exits (Saad, Fantasia) and Daniher’s departure reflected deeper cultural and structural issues.
Draft luck turns: Priority‑pick rules had already shifted; then the COVID‑hit 2020 draft limited under‑18 data. With multiple early picks, league‑wide uncertainty made outcomes noisier; trading out would have drawn limited return.
VFL program degradation: A once-strong development pathway (mid‑2010s prelims) wasn’t rapidly rebuilt post‑COVID, costing growth for players like the cohort that followed Ridley/Redman/Langford. Investment has since resumed.
Coaching transition: The Worsfold→Rutten handover avoided a hard break but also avoided a competitive selection process. Without a decisive mandate and with under‑resourcing, Rutten’s tenure never had a fair runway.
Lesson: After shocks, you must over‑invest in the fundamentals (pathways, process, people) and be ruthless in role clarity.
The Common Threads (2001–2022)
Impatience at key moments led to shortcuts.
Underinvestment (facilities, high performance, development) lagged competitors at times.
Process gaps (governance, hiring rigor, coach selection) created future crises.
Timing and luck (injuries, rule changes, COVID) mattered but robust systems should blunt variance.
Here and Now: The Brad Scott Era (2023– )
We won’t know the verdict for years, but some markers differ from past cycles:
Football investment is back with Hird‑era lessons baked in (governance first).
Football-first alignment: from board to football ops, the focus is on on‑field outcomes.
Long‑horizon list strategy: optionality preserved on picks and trades rather than burning future capital.
Deliberateness over rush: decisions feel sequenced, with i’s dotted and t’s crossed.
What still matters:
Getting high performance right
Timing the right big trade rather than chasing headlines.
Continual VFL and development pathway investment.
Process discipline in every appointment and program.
Resilience to external pressure when short‑term results wobble.
At‑a‑Glance Timeline
1990s: Talent tailwinds (zones, expansion). System credit over luck recognition.
2001–07: Underinvestment, cap fire sale, middling drafts; Sheedy exits.
2008–10: Knights inherits structural issues; some good drafting.
2010–13: Evans/Hird pivot; governance failure → SAGA.
2016–19: Stabilise, trade aggressively; Daniher injuries expose risk; standards drift.
2020–22: COVID shocks; exits; VFL pathway dips; Rutten handover falters.
2023–25: Scott era: rebuild standards, invest, plan long‑term; major injury review.

Conclusion
Essendon’s finals win drought isn’t one villain or one mistake. It’s twenty‑plus years of moments where luck ran dry, process fell short, or urgency overrode patience. The current project must convert those lessons into habit: invest in the right things, hire through rigorous process, protect future optionality, and resist the quick fix. If the club holds that line, the next finals win should be a waypoint - not a destination.




Comments